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How Effective Is the
National Labor Relations Board?
The National Labor Relations Act, a product of legzs-
lative compromise, contains certain defects that make
effective administration of the act difficult. The NLRB,
Mr. Graham indicates, has magnified these defects by
adopting procedures that make intelligent prediction of
the legality of union or employer conduct impossible. In
this Article, Mr. Graham analyzes some of the inherent
weaknesses of the act tluht underlie the ineffectiveness
of the Board. He points out that judicial review of Board
orders has added to the diffiwulties of labor-management
relations. Mr. Graham concludes that the importance of
the NLRB as the protector of industrial stability has been
overemphasized; for, in his opinion, most labor disputes
are ultimately resolved by the forces of unbalanced eco-
nomic power, rather than by the intervention of the
NLRB.
James J. Graham*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much, if not all, of the recent criticism of the National Labor
Relations Board tends to exaggerate its importance to the indus-
trial life of this country. Ironically, this same misapprehension
of the present or potential effectiveness of the Board in eliminat-
ing "the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce"' has been a major factor in creating serious defects
in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act- and
in stifling recent efforts to reform some of those defects. There is
also reason to believe that the perennial preoccupation of Con-
gress with the procedural and substantive aspects of the act di-
verts legislative effort from more compelling, if not less contro-
versial, social legislation.
It is the primary purpose here, however, to attempt to demon-
strate that even as "reformed," the Board's usefulness, especially
in regard to the prevention and remedy of unfair labor practices,
*Member of the New York Bar.
1. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1958).
2. National Iabor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. M 151-68 (1958).
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is somewhat limited for reasons more basic than the factor of
undue delay in the Board's processes. To be more specific:
(a) The NLRA, a product of competing political pressures,
contains few precise prohibitions and, on balance, more form than
substance. Many of the provisions of the act, therefore, are sub-
ject to varying interpretations, often dependent in part upon the
ideological complexion of the five-man Board.
(b) The courts have severely restricted the Board's attempts
to exercise its administrative expertise in accommodating the
generalities of the act to the complex realities of modern labor-
management relations.
(c) The Board itself has overemphasized its quasi-judicial
character by adhering to an ad hoc approach in its decisions,
while usually grounding its ratio decidendi on a policy considera-
tion, or on a vague criterion such as "reasonableness." 3 In some
cases, the ratio cannot be ascertained at all.4 Consequently, the
Board has failed to furnish adequate guidance to those employers
and labor organizations who sincerely wish to comply with Board
law and to labor practitioners who find it increasingly difficult to
advise their clients as to the legality of a given course of conduct."
II. THE GENESIS OF THE NLRA
Section 2 of the original National Labor Relations Act' (popu-
larly known as the Wagner Act7) created a three-man Board that
was to be appointed by the President to act as an independent
regulatory agency.8 The 1935 legislation successfully preserved
section 7(a) of the earlier National Industrial Recovery Act,10
S. See, e.g., Publishers' Ass'n, 139 N.LR.B. 1092 (1962).
4. In Spiegelberg Lumber & Bldg. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1960) the
Board majority failed to state whether its finding of a violation of § 8(b)(2)
of the NLRA depended upon the mere existence of a contract containing a
union-security clause or upon an assumption that the union caused the dis-
criminatee'6 discharge pursuant to the union-isecurity clause.
5. See Note, Administrative Law Making Through Adjudication: The
National Labor Relations Board, 45 MiNi. L. Rav. 609, 639 (1961): "[Therc
may -be unconscious violations [of the NLRA] which would be avoided if the
parties involved were apprised of the policy of the Board in advance."
6. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
7. See Keyserling, The Wagner Act; Its Origin and Current Significance,
29 GEo. WAsa. L. REv. 199 (1960).
8. The Board was enlarged to five members by § 3(a) of the 1947 amend-
ments. 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 154 (1958).
9. Which was declared constitutional in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
10. 48 Stat. 195 (1933), amended, ch. 246, 49 Stat. 375 (1935) (declared
unconstitutional in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935)).
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which had been accepted reluctantly by industry leaders as the
quid pro quo for the so-called "codes of fair competition." n The
principles contained in section 7(a), now section 7 of the NILRA; 3
constitute to this date the cornerstone of federal labor relations
policy.
The right to organize and the right to bargain collectively, in
a sense, have a common-law origin and certainly antedated the
NTRA. During the First World War, the National War Labor
Board proscribed any interference by employers with "section 7"
rights. According to Justice Frankfurter in Phelps Dodge Corp.,14
these rights arose as an inevitable corollary of the principle of
freedom in organization in modern industry. Labor unions were
organized "out of the necessities of the situation . . .. [U]nion
was essential to give laborers an opportunity to deal on terms of
equality with their employer!"'5
This developing history and the act which codified it have
been based, however, on the concept of collective rights. Proceed-
ings under the NLRA do not contemplate the adjudication of
11. See SPENcER, CoLan- vE BAIRGAInNG UNaza SECTION 7(A) OF TiE
NRA 4 .(1935).
12. Section 7(a) read in part:
Every code of fair competition... shall contain the following con-
ditions:
1) That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain col-
lectively through representatives of .their own choosing, and shall be
free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor,
or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-
organization or in other concerted activities for -the purpose of collective
,bargaining or other mutual aid or protection;
2) That no employee and no one seeking employment shall be re-
quired as a condition of employment to join any company union or to
refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his
own choosing ....
ch. 90, 48 Stat. 198-99 (1933).
18. Section 7 of the NLRA reads:
Employees shall -have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3).
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 uIS.C. § 157 (1959).
14. -Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941).
15. Id. at 183, 185. In support of this proposition the Court cited Amer-
ican Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921). See also
BurFoRD, THE WAGm AcT; EaPLoYEE AND E~iorYE RELATIoNS 3-4 (1941).
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private rights as such: The Board acts in a public capacity to
give effect to a public policy statute.10 Furthermore, since its in-
ception, the statute, notwithstanding the motivations of some of
the legislators, 17 has acknowledged no raison d'etre more moral
and/or more profound than the principle of free enterprise.' 8
By enacting the NLRA, Congress did not intend to interfere
with "the free play of economic forces but [sought] to assure that
the play of those forces be truly free."'" The ultimate concern of
Congress, as well as the source of its power, was the mainte-
nance of the free flow of commerce ° In fact, a statement written
in 1935 by Professor William H. Spencer concerning section 7(a)
of the NIRA is still convincing: "[Section 7(a)] apparently con-
templates a society of large, theoretically well-balanced pressure
groups. In the field of industrial relations it assumes a possible
situation in which workers as a class are ranged against employers
as a class." 21
The same author also wrote that the right of a worker to be free
from the interference of his fellow workers is not coextensive with
his right to be free from the interference of employers, nor is it,
popularly speaking, as comprehensive as the latter.' The concept
16. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940).
17. Mr. Keyserling, a close associate of the late Senator Wagner, states
that Senator Wagner considered the act as a vehicle for economic and social
progress and not as a mere weapon for negating industrial strife. This view
was not generally shared, however. In fact, according to Keyserling, Senator
Wagner succeeded in having his legislation enacted almost by the sheer force
of his own personality, aided -by the economic climate then prevailing. The
executive branch did not support the bill with enthusiasm and, ironically,
many of the craft unions were openly antagonistic. According to Keyserling,
the bill could not have been enacted in 19838. Keyserling, supra note 7, at 202,
207, 218.
18. Parenthetically, the English historians Sidney and Beatrice Webb
noted that the right to strike in England was always a mere derivative of
freedom of contract. See WEBB & WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM
664 (2d ed. 1920).
19. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 183 (1941) (Frankfurter,
J.).
20. See Id. at 182.
21. SPENCER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 83.
In view of the economic justification for a statute which, in part, has a
quasi-criminal code aspect, it is not so astonishing that "despite over 25 years
of statutory prohibition and widespread publicity, the number of unfair labor
practices grows, rather than diminishes, and at an alarming rate." STAFF OF
SuBcomm. oN NLRB OF HOUSE CoMvnM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87TH
CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT BY T NLRB 1 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as
PucINsKI SuBcoMr. REP.].
22. SPENcER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 83.
of noninterference by co-workers (at least collectively) with sec-
tion 7 rights was certainly jolted by the 1947 amendments to the
act, which proscribed for the first time certain unfair labor prac-
tices by unions. Although critics have differed as to whether the
Taft-Hartley amendments radically changed the basic objectives
of the acVs there can be no question that section 8(b), however
laudable the intent of its authors, was a foreign branch grafted
onto the trunk of the Wagner Act, adding difficulties of interpre-
tation for the Board and for the courts.2 '
III. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NLRA
A. Tun Roim oF CONGmSS
The NLRB, as an independent regulatory agency, exists at the
will of Congress and is subject to its legislative power. Since the
Board, at the same time, must remain "judicially" independent,
its position is an ambiguous one.25 The Board is entrusted with
the task of administering a statute which for the purpose, inter
alia, of flexible administration does not specify in precise and un-
mistakable language what conduct Congress intended to proscribe
as unfair labor practices? 6
While, admittedly, the Taft-Hartley amendments were "to a
marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between
strong contending forces and deeply -held views on the role of
organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation,"27 the
Board, nevertheless, must seek to strike a "balance" without read-
ing into the statute policies that failed of enactment 8 Moreover,
23. See, e.g., Feldesman, The Supreie Court and Collective Bargaining
Under the National Labor Relatios Act, 13 LAB. LI. 339, 340 (1962) (the
amendments merely changed 'the "rules of the game"). One commentator ob-
served that in 1947 many Selt "it was high time for the Government to discard
its role of being a statutory sponsor of organized labor and assume the role
of a neutral umpire." The promotion of collective bargaining is not an end in
itself but a means to the end of promoting the "normal flow of commerce."
Jenkins, What Is the National Labor Relations Board?, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 354,
361-62 (1959); Ratner, The Quasi-Judicial NLRB Revisited, L2 LAn. L.I. 085,
686 (1961) (the amendments sought merely to "equalize" the statute but did
not divert or dilute its primary aim of the promotion of collective irgaining).
24. See-text accompanying notes 119-58 infra.
25. See Farmer, Problems of Organization and Admin4tration of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 29 Go. WAsH. L. IRv. 5, 355 (1960).
26. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NRB, 324 US. 793, 798 (1945).
27. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 357 US.
93, 99-100 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.).
28. See id. at 100. See also Ratner, supra note 23, at 686: "The legislative
history [of Taft-Hrtley] revealed . that almost every provision reflected
a compromise....
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the NLRB must not substitute its own moral judgment or even
the sentiments of the community for the will of Congress.2?9
Since the inception of the NLRA, these legislative compro-
mises have generated future controversies that have limited the
Board's potential effectiveness.80 Professor Archibald Cox (now
Solicitor General of the United States) reportedly has said con-
cerning the enactment of section 8(b) (7)8' in 1959 that "the very
few men close to the conference report who understood this prob-
lem had no common intentions- perhaps had conflicting inten-
tions would be a better phrase. ' 2
The problems of administering such a statute are further com-
plicated by a tendency on the part of the courts in recent years
to restrain bold approaches by the Board, especially in respect
to unfair labor practices by labor organizations. 8 Despite its
broad mandate, the Board cannot proceed, for example, into a
new area of "regulation" of collective bargaining 4 or of the opera-
tions of hiring halls, 5 which, in the opinion of the Supreme Court,
Congress has not entrusted to the Board. In addition, congres-
sional attitudes toward proposals for more effective administration
of the NLRA are frequently influenced by their possible impact
on the substance of Board decisions,8 6 or, more cynically, by a
fear that the act might work too well. 7
Much of the recent criticism of the NLRB has emphasized the
undue lapse of time in the processing of the average unfair labor
practice case between the issuance of a complaint by the General
Counsel and a final decision and order by the five-man Board.
In fact, the Report of James M. Landis to President-Elect Ken-
nedy in 1960, in contrast to its criticism of the other regulatory
29. See Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HIAuv. L. REv. 1401,
1437 (1958).
30. See Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
31. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1059, 73 Stat.
519, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. I, 1959).
32. Address by NLRB Member Gerald A. Brown, Labor Law Section of
the Minnesota Bar Ass'n (pt. 1), in New York Law Journal, July 24, 1902, p.
4, col. 2. See also Note, Organizational and Recognition Picketing; Permissible
Activity Under The Landrum-Griffin Amendments, 36 ST. JouN's L. REV. 293,
294 (1962).
83. See text accompanying notes 119-58 infra.
34. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 500 (1960).
35. Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
36. See Farmer, supra note 25, at 355.
37. See Landis, Perspectives on the Administrative Process, 14 AD. L.
REv. 66, 70 (1961).
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agencies, was comparatively mild about the "failings" of the
NLRB. Landis, although critical of the separation of functions
between the Board and its General Counsel, concentrated prima-
rily on the element of delay as seriously hampering the Board's
effectiveness.38
Landis' Reorganization Plan No. 5 would have permitted the
Board to delegate final authority to decide unfair labor practice
cases to its trial examiners, with provisions for limited review by
the Board itself. This would have reduced the Board's case load
and the consequent time-lag in processing," but it was defeated
in the House of Representatives, 40 and prospects for future pas-
sage of the Plan in either chamber of Congress are rather dim.
Dean Landis quite candidly has ascribed the defeat of the Reor-
ganization Plans to unworthy political considerations: "[Mi]en of
respectability . . . attacked [the delegation] feature of the Plans
on the ground that the entire functions of the agency could po-
tentially be delegated to one of the janitors.!''
A representative of the National Association of Manufacturers
testified that he opposed the Plan because "one man's delay is
the other man's due process." 2 This wry comment contains more
than a grami of truth, considering the nature of the statute itself
and the fact that the element of delay is certainly built into the
act. But efficient administration even of an imperfect statute
would seem to be a nonpartisan consideration. Expedition in this
area is of particular importance because of the volatile nature of
labor relations and the "perishable nature of the problems of the
Board's clients."4 3 Congress not only has been aware of these fac-
tors, but, as Dean Landis has bluntly indicated, Congress has
responded to the appeals of the proponents of delay by affirming
the status quo.
Although more striking examples of congressional "inertia"
38. See Note, The Progress of Federal Agency Reorganization Under the
Kennedy Administration, 48 VA. L. Plv. 300, 344 (1962).
39. Id. at 344; Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1961, in HLR. Doc. No. 172,
87fth Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The Plan would have authorized delegation of
any function to a "division of the Board, individual Board member, hearing
examiner, employee or employee board" and would -have substituted princi-
ples of discretionary review Sor the present mandatory review. Id. at 2-3. See
generally Auerbach, Scope of Authority of Federal Administrative Agencies To
Delegate Decisim Making to Hearing Ezaminnera, 48 Mj!x. L. REv. 823 (1964).
40. 107 CoxG. lc. 13069-78 (1961).
41. Landis, supra note 37, at 72-73.
42. Id. at 70.
43. McCulloch, The NLRB and Techniques for Ezpediting the Adminis-
trative Process, 14 Ai. L. Itv. 97 (1961).
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can be cited in other areas, 44 it is particularly noteworthy here
that despite their alleged political and/or philosophical persua-
sions, all of the Board members and General Counsel Rothman
endorsed Reorganization Plan No. 5. The past three chairmen
of the Board have favored limiting the scope of review of the
trial examiner's intermediate report to situations where at least
two Board members decide that review is warranted because of
clear errors of fact, law, or procedure, or because of important
legal or policy considerations.4 The delegation proposals assume,
of course, "a less egalitarian" 46 approach to cases coming before
the Board, but the problem of determining the "important"
cases 47 could not have been a sincere excuse for defeating the Plan,
especially in view of the above limitations4s and compared with
the enormous problem of reducing the Board's work load.40
The fate of Reorganization Plan No. 5 does not augur well for
the enactment of other proposals for reform of the Board's proc-
esses, at least those that require congressional approval. For ex-
ample, Mr. Stuart Rothman has suggested the institution of
three-man boards in regions throughout the country to perform
the duties of trial examiners. This proposal, according to Mr.
Rothman, would bring "federal law to the people"; it would create
a sense of community responsibility in the regional boards and
would permit a more extensive utilization of oral argument and
prehearing conferences. The Board, like the Supreme Court, would
be free to decide novel questions of law affecting future decisions.
The former General Counsel's proposal undoubtedly contains
much merit, but it assumes that in most cases the parties would
be satisfied with decisions by a three-man Board of competent per-
sons and would not appeal their decision. 0 This assumption, how-
44. For example, the usually unanimous recommendations of the Civil
Rights Commission, a nonpartisan, highly responsible group representing a
spectrum of regional and other viewpoints have had slight impact on federal
legislation.
45. See McCulloch, supra note 48, at 99; see PuciN Kxi SUBCOMa. lRia.
10-12.
46. See Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 30
COLuTm. L. Rar. 429 (1960).
47. Address by NLRB General Counsel Stuart Rothman, 15th Annual
Fall Industrial Relations Conference of the Asociated Industries of Cleveland,
Sept. 20, 1962, -in CCII 1962 LAB. RE. REP. 8119; See also Farmer, supra
note 25, at 365.
48. See Landis, upra note 37, at 79-73.
49. See Address by Rothman, supra note 47. See also Address by NLRB
Executive Secretary Ogden W. Fields, Labor Law Section of American Bar
Association, San Francisco, August 6, 1962, in 50 L.R.R.M. 38 (1962).
50. Address by Rothman, upra note 47.
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ever, overlooks the very important element of delay in this area
that quite often supersedes the desire for a final determination of
a contested unfair labor practice charge.
Mr. Rothman's proposal can also be attacked on the same
grounds as other similar proposals for the transfer of the Board's
judicial functions to the existing federal courts or to a newly
created Administrative Court of the United States.5' Aside from
the difficulty of receiving congressional approval, such proposals
do not advance far because of the apparent difficulty, inherent in
most administrative agencies, of separating the judicial functions
of the agency from its other functions. 2 There is, furthermore, a
serious question of the wisdom of such separation inasmuch as it
undermines the very basis for the existence of administrative
agencies - the need for "flexibility through discretion)"' to cope,
like equity, with situations for which the existing judicial system
is inadequate. 4
The former General Counsel's proposal serves therefore to re-
emphasize the quasi-judicial character of the Board which Con-
gress fostered in 1947 by separating the powers of the General
Counsel from the five-man Board. 5 In the early days of the Wag-
ner Act, the Board was in fact and in theory both judge and
prosecutor, frequently determining ab initio whether complaint
should issue in specific cases. By 1947 the situation had so changed
that the five-man Board confined its duties almost exclusively to
final decisions and orders, but the stigma remained. 0 Ironically,
one further justification advanced in 1947 for the separation was
that the law had become so well established through Board and
court decisions that the General Counsel need only enforce it!
51. Comm'n on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Legal Services and Procedure, H.R. Doc. No. 128, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955). The (Hoover) Commission proposed that some functions of some ad-
ministrative agencies be transferred to either the regular courts or to a newly
created Administrative Court of the United States. See also McFarland,
Landis' Report: The Voice of One Crying in The Wilderness, 47 VA. L. 11Ev.
373, 404 (1961). In August, 1963, Congressman Phil Landrum proposed legis-
lation that would transfer unfair labor practice cases to the district courts.
H.R. 8246, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). "[Tjhe NLRB," he said, "has passed
the point of no return." 53 L..LRM. 87 (1963).
52. See McFarland, supra note 51, at 404.
53. Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Administrative De-
CisiOus, 59 WEST VA. L. REv. 111, 131 (1957).
54. Landis, supra note 37, at 66.
55. NLRA § 3(d), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 US.C. § 153(d) (1959); see H.R.
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1947); Ratner, Policy Making by the
New "Quasi-Judicial" NLRB, 23 U. Cwr. L. REv. 12 (1955).
56. See Farmer, supra note 25, at 355; Note, 48 VA. L. REv. 300, 341 (1962).
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The substantive amendments of 1947 of course, have created a
host of problems, discussed elsewhere in this Article, that have
not, and probably never will be, fully resolved. The General
Counsel, therefore, although not a "prosecutor" in the opinion of
Mr. Rothman," is admittedly an "Attorney-General ' s for labor
law, but an Attorney-General who as a matter of necessity, pru-
dence or justice must proceed to complaint "in close cases.""
The detached observer finds it difficult to believe that the
General Counsel cannot seek from the Board an indication of its
attitude toward novel questions of jurisdiction or law before
authorizing extensive investigation of the instant charges and pro-
ceeding to complaint or finally dismissing the charges.00 Further-
more, in respect to matters which apparently are not within the
purview of the act, but may be, the Board cannot make its own
determination.6' The General Counsel, therefore, is in a position
to dictate policy.2 In any event, despite these and other criticisms
of the separation of powers, the practice is now so well en-
trenched in our administrative system that there is no likelihood
of change. In fact, the tendency may be toward greater separa-
tion of the Board's judicial and nonjudicial functions."4
Although the Board maintains an outward appearance of sta-
57. Rothman, Office of General Counsel of NLRB, 12 LAB. L.J. 698, 714
(1961).
58. Address by Rothman, supra note 47.
59. Ibid.
60. The Board's Statements of Procedure permits a party to a labor dis-
pute before an agency or court of a state or territory to petition the NLRB
for an advisory opinion as to whether it would assert jurisdiction over the
matter. 29 C.F.R. § 101.39 (1963). Such procedure is available to the Board's
General Counsel only when a representation petition and unfair labor prac-
tice charges involving the same employer are pending in a regional office. 29
C.F.R. § 101.42 (1963).
61. Section 3(d) of the NLRA confers "final authority" upon the General
Counsel to determine whether or not a complaint should issue. 61 Stat. 139
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1959).
62. See Farmer, supra note 25, at 360. For example, in Hughes Tool Co.,
104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1962), Mr. Rothman authorized issuance of complaint on
a racial discrimination issue for the first time in the history of -the NLRB. 52
L.R.R.M. 59 (1963).
63. See McFarland, upra note 51, at 408: "[Landis] sees a single-minded
aggregation of public servants exercising any and all powers of governance for
the implementation and enforcement of public law." See also Friendly, supra
note 46, at 438.
64. See Farmer, supra note 25, at 356. Hector, Problems of CAB and the
Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YAIz L.J. 931 (1960), proposes that
the executive branch determine policy, that the adjudicative functions be
transferred to an administrative court and that enforcement powers be trans-
ferred ,to the Department of Justice.
bility, there is reason to doubt the certainty of its administrative
position. NLRB officials seem optimistic about the resolution of
the Board's problems65 and about its general effectiveness as a
regulatory agency.66 Concurrently, public statements of Board
members indicate a definite uncertainty67 about the Board's
ability to cope with the enormous backlog of unfair labor practice
cases, which creates "an unconscionable delay in ...processing
... which renders final ... decisions almost nugatory and
futile."s
B. INHMENT WntxRESSES OF THE NLRA.
If, as indicated above, Congress' failure to respond to non-
partisan appeals for reform of the Board procedures stems prima-
rily from political considerations, the fears of those legislators
who are sympathetic to partisan interests, particularly those of
management, are largely unfounded. 9 There are defects and limi-
tations built into the core of the act which provide cogent argu-
ments against its alleged effectiveness even as "reformed."
In view of the nature of the statute and in view of the economic
realities (for example, it is almost axiomatic that the advent of
a union usually increases an employer's labor costs; hence, a
lengthy strike may be to the employer's economic advantage if
he ultimately removes the collective bargaining representative
from the premises; on the other hand, industrial stability, with
or without a union, may be of sole concern to a particular em-
ployer), it is fair to conclude that settlement of unfair labor prac-
tice charges and complaints is often motivated by considerations
unrelated to fear of the Board's processes. Furthermore, the num-
ber of "unsophisticated" employers is presumably decreasing with
65. See Rothman, supra note 57, at 701: "Mn my view there probably is
not any backlog problem caused by delay in ease handling that cannot be
eliminated by -hard work Many troubles that appeared insurmountable just
seem to go away under plain, consistent hard work ...."
66. See Address by Brown, supra note 32, p. 4, eols. 1-3; Address by NLRB
Ohairman Frank W. McCulloch, ABA Labor IRelations Law Section at San
Francisco, Aug. 7, 1962, in 50 L.R.RM. 36 (1962); Feldesman, supra note 23.
67. See Address by Fields, supra note 49; Address :by Rothman, supra
note 47.
68. Address by NLRB Chairman Frank W. McCulloch, Federal Bar As-
sociation Meeting, Sept 13, 1961, in 3 CCH La.. Rm. REP. 8006, quoting
from PucINS i SUBCOmm. REP. 1.
69. For example, two of the three Republican members of the Pucinaki
Subcommittee made no recommendations for reform except that the Board's
decisional powers be transferred to federal district courts, saying that the
PucinsI hearings had become a partisan attack on the 'TEisenhower Board."
48 L.RI.M. 98 (1961).
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the widespread publicity given to labor-management relations in
recent years.70
Consequently, a reading of the statistics in the NLRB annual
reports and the pronouncements of Board officials about the effec-
tiveness of their agency can be misleading. It is true, however,
that in regard to representation matters, a substantial portion of
the work of the Board,71 the NLRB does perform a service to
labor relations by determining:
a) whether a question concerning representation exists and,
if so,
b) the appropriate unit for bargaining, and finally,
c) the wishes of the employees in said unit in a secret-ballot
election. 2
For many employers, for altruistic reasons or otherwise, the Certi-
fication of Representatives issued by the Board signals full recog-
nition of the union and acceptance of serious bargaining. But, at
the same time, Chairman McCulloch's declaration that a major
object of the act, "effective collective bargaining,"7' has been
achieved seems more hopeful than realistic. Mr. McCulloch based
his optimism on a survey that showed that collective bargaining
agreements followed 92 percent of the certifications issued in 1960
by the Board's Atlanta office and approximately 84 percent of
the certifications by the Boston and Pittsburgh regional offices.
The fact that contracts were successfully negotiated in these
cases can best be attributed to the same economic motivations
that result in the settlement of unfair labor practice cases, rather
than to the "refusal to bargain" provisions of the NLRA. 74 Sig-
nificantly, the same survey also showed that 66 percent of the
election victories which preceded the successful negotiations oc-
curred in skilled-craft units of 30 employees or less. The Board's
statistics actually show that the percentage of union victories
declines sharply as the size of the unit increases.7 These statistics
tend to establish that a union's economic strength is a major
70. The Pucinski Subcommittee found that the number of unfair labor
practices grows "at an alarming rate." PuciNsKi SuBcomrn. REP. 1.
71. The 1962 NLRB Annual Report shows that 11,369 representation
petitions and 13,479 unfair labor practice charges were filed in 1961-1962. 27
NLRB ANN. REP. 3 (1962).
72. NLRA §§ 9(b), (c)(1), 61 Stat. 143-44 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(b),
(c)(1) (1959).
73. Address by NLRB Chairman Frank W. McCulloch, American Bar
Association's Labor Relations Law Section at San Francisco, Aug. 7, 1902, in
50 L.R.R.M. 36 (1962).
74. NLRA §§ 8(u)(5), (b)(3), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5).
(b)(8) (1958).
75. 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 279 (1962).
factor in successful negotiations, because the problem of organ-
izing a substantial number of employees not only to win an NLRB
election but, more importantly, to call an effective strike, in-
creases with the size of the (unskilled or semi-skilled) unit and
the availability of striker-replacements. Furthermore, although
representation decisions are not directly reviewable in the courts7h
absent unusual circumstances,17 an employer may obtain review
of such determinations by refusing to bargain with a certified
union and contesting the resulting unfair labor practice charge
on the ground that the Board erred in the earlier representation
proceeding.78
It is also true that by virtue of its powers under section 10()
of the NLRA79 the Board is able to procure relatively swift and
effective injunctive relief for employers faced with threatened or
actual violations& of section 8(b)(4) or with illegal picketing in
violation of section. 8(b) (7). 80 In addition, the Board, in jurisdic-
tional dispute cases, especially since the Supreme Court's OBS
decision,"' makes the fmal determination of work assignments be-
tween competing unions. Since these matters constitute but a
76. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Mc-
Leod, 302 F2d 854 (2d Cir. 1962).
77. See Leedom v. JKyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) where the Court held that
the Board's action in including professional employees in a nonprofessional
unit was patently illegal in contravention of NIRA § 9(b), 61 Stat. 143 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1958).
78. Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco, 310 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1962). The
fact that such tactics are deemed legitimate by the courts is ironic in view of
the PucinsId Subcommittee's recommendation that the NLRB "disbar" at-
tomeys who advise their clients to commit unfair labor practices. PucwnsmI
SUBCOMMUn REPORT 2.
Employers in -the Fourth Circuit have successfully used the unfair labor
practice route to attack the Board's policy of granting separate craft represen-
tation, except in Sour industries, regardless of the degree of integration of plant
operations. Royal M Bee Corp. v. NLRB, 302 Fad 30 (4th Cir. 1902); NLRtB
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959).
79. 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (Supp. IV, 1962).
80. During 1962, injunctions were granted in 87 cases and denied in 15
cases. Another 197 petitions for -injunctive relief were settled or placed on the
district courts' inactive dockets. 27 NLRB Azr. REP. 21 (1962). This relief,
however, is not always speedy, primarily because problems of interpreting
close questions of law arising from ambiguous statutory provisions must re-
quire lengthy deliberation at the regional office level and in Washington.
Futhermore, even in routine cases the inevitable delay of seven or eight days
between the :fling of a charge under § 8(b)(4) or § 8(b)(7) and injunctive
relief often proves "fatal" to particularly vulnerable employers.
81. NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Bng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573
(1961).
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small portion of the Board's unfair labor practice caseload,8 2 and
since it is the purpose of this Article to show, inter alia, merely
that the Board's potential effectiveness is exaggerated, the em-
phasis here will be placed on the Board's major and traditional
activity of protecting "section 7 rights" against violations by
employers of sections 8(a) (1), (2), (3) and (5).11
To begin with, the problem of delay is inherent in the statute
because its ambiguities, created by legislative compromises (dis-
cussed above) coupled with the failure of the Board to clarify its
decisions, and the tendency of the courts to restrict the Board in
the exercise of its expertise (to be discussed) obviously create de-
lays at the regional office level and prolonged and perhaps un-
necessary litigation before trial examiners. Furthermore, the
Board lacks the power to enforce its own orders; absent voluntary
compliance, it must petition a court of appeals for enforcement.
An aggrieved party (whether the charging party or respondent)
may petition the court for review of the Board's order." Such
proceedings are not uncommon;86 in fact, "enforcement litigation
has spiraled rapidly.' 87
The average time span from the date of the charge to an effec-
tive judicial decree, in any large number of important cases, is
more than two years.8  It requires, on the average, over 300 days
to process a charge from the date of filing to issuance of a Board
decision and order.89 It is difficult to see, therefore, given the in-
evitable delays present under ideal circumstances, how even
radical reforms in Board procedures can reduce the time-lag to
a point where a statutory remedy will in any real sense effectuate
the policies of the actY0
82. Approximately 11%. 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 262 (1962).
83. Since in the usual situation, and by its express terms, a § 8(b)(2) dis-
crimination by a union usually results in a concomitant § 8(a)(3) violation by
an employer, the two subsections will be discussed together.
84. NLRA § 10(e), 61 Stat. 147-48 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958); see
Note, 70 Y.LE L.J. 1366, 1374 (1961).
85. NLRA J 10(f), 61 Stat. 148-49 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1958).
86. In 1962, 679 unfair labor practice eases were closed after a Board
decision as compared to 348 after action by -a court of appeals and 54 after
action by the Supreme Court. 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 270 (1962).
87. Id. at 21.
88. Address by Rothman, supra note 47.
89. See Address by General Counsel Arnold Ordman, Southwestern Legal
Foundation, Dallas, Tex., Oct. 31, 1963. Although this figure represents a
sharp decline from previous years, Board officials apparently have offered no ex-
planation for the trend.
90. See Note, Statutory and Contractual Restrictions on the Right To
Strike During the Term of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 70 YALE LJ.
1366, 1374 (1961).
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It has been said that "justice delayed for the unemployed
worker is justice denied, for unless he is put back on the job with-
in a short time, he must seek employment opportunities else-
where, and his case becomes largely academic.'91 This statement
is as relevant to the case of the worker discriminatorily discharged
in violation of section 8(a) (3)92 who has been out of work four or
five months as it is to the discriminatee who must wait two years
for a court order reinstating him.
The Board (and the courts), of course, can order the employer
to reinstate the dischargee and to make him "whole" (this remedy
includes back pay and/or any other losses that may be construed
as wages suffered as a result of the discrimination). But interim
earnings must be deducted from this sum, so, as a practical mat-
ter, the discriminatee who suffers more than a de minimis financial
loss, at least in relation to the total number of discriminatees who
are entitled annually to recover their losses, is presumably rather
uncommon. The Board's 1962 report shows that approximately
2465 employees received, on the average, 710 dollars apiece in
back pay during that fiscal year 3 These figures are swollen by
one or two major cases each year involving employers who have
discriminatorily refused to reinstate employees determined by the
Board to be unfair labor practice strikers.9 ' In relation therefore
to the total number of employers involved in unfair labor prac-
tices each year, the annual back-pay liabilities again appear to
be rather insignificant.
Finally, it is not unlikely that an employer, especially in a
major case, may deem it to be to his economic advantage to delay
making payment as long as possible by litigating the amount of
back pay due. The ten-year history of Masto Plastics Inc.P may
91. McCulloch, supra note 43, at 97.
92. Illegal discrimination was alleged in 75% of the charges filed against
employers. 27 NLRB AwN. REP. 7 (1962).
93. Id. at 13. In 1961, 3500 employees received approximately $425 apiece.
26 NULRB AwN. Pn. 221 (1961).
94. See, e.g., Local 833, UAW v. NLRB, S00 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.), enforcing
in part 128 NI.LR.B. 1062 (1962); Jacobs Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 35 (1962)
(201 staikers entitled to back pay).
95. 103 N.I.R.B. 511 (1953), enforced, 214 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954), affd,
350 U.S. 270, rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 908 (1956). The respondent em-
ployer was subsequently adjudged in contempt of the enforcement order.
NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 261 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1958). The respondent
purged itself ,by complying with the original order and by paying the costs
of the NLRB in the contempt proceeding. Eight years after issuance of the
original order -the NLRB determined the amount of back pay owing to the
discriminatees, some of whom could not be located. Mastro Plastics Corp.,
136 N.LR.B. 1342 (1962).
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be an extreme example, but the case does illustrate the possibili-
ties for delay available both to the employer who finds it worth-
while to defy a Board order and to the employer who sincerely
questions his liability for the alleged violations and the back pay
owing thereunder."
That portion of the total 8(a) (3) violations which results from
union pressure in violation of section 8(b)(2) presents legal prob-
lems of its own that may or may not result in substantial in-
justices in particular cases. Generally, 8(a)(S)-8(b)(2) discrim-
ination, unlike the classic 8(a)(8) activity which is grounded in
opposition to unionization or to a specific union, raises questions
as to the rights of individual workers as opposed to the group, or
in another vein, the feasibility of compliance with Taft-Hartley's
ban on the closed shop in certain industries where the closed shop
is indigenous. 7
The second most common charge filed against employers is
under section 8(a)(5), alleging a "refusal to bargain in good
faith."' Here also it is difficult to conceive how even radical
measures to speed up the Board's processes can ever make this
section of the act meaningful. Concededly,
the union [during negotiations] resorts -to strike action and gets its
desired contracts or, alternatively, the union is too weak to strike and
fades from the scene as its members lose confidence in its ability to
improve conditions of employment. In either event, economic strength
is substituted for orderly administrative process, and the nation's labor
policy- to encourage the practices and procedures of collectivo bar-
gaining -is thwarted. 99
96. The Board in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 710 (1962)
for the first time ordered interest at 6% to be computed in back-pay awards
but still it is apparent that in large cases the employer's investment profits on
the money withheld may exceed both the 6% and his legal fees.
I had occasion -to participate in a back pay hearing in 1963 involving about
200 claimants, which consumed over 60 hearing sessions. The unfair labor
practice strike which gave rise to the proceedings occurred in 1953-1954. The
employer moved in a circuit court to enjoin the back pay hearing on the
ground that the NLRB regional office had delayed four and one-half years
in issuing the back pay specification. The NLRB attorneys successfully re-
sisted the employer's motion by arguing in effect that such delays are not
uncommon! It is true, however, that -traditionally the defense of laches will
not bar administrative proceedings of this nature.
97. See Graham, Taft-Hartley's Enigmatic Section 8(bX2), 12 LA,3. L.J.
108, 1040 .(1961).
98. MceCulloch, The NLRB and Techniques for Expediting the Administra-
tive Process, 14 AD. L. Rnv. 98 (1961); section 8(a)(5) allegations figured in
94.9% of the 9231 charges filed against employers in 1961-1962. 27 N.I.R.B. 202
(1962).
99. McCulloch, supra note 98, at 98.
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Aside from the effect of the Board order, it is apparent from Chair-
man McCulloch's statement that whether the order is issued six
months after the commission of the unfair labor practice or two
years later, economic strength will be the decisive factor in the
negotiations.'O
The element of delay sometimes results in situations where an
employer is forced by a Board order and court decree to recognize
and bargain with a union that no longer represents a majority of
its employees. In fact, in seasonal industries, the complement of
employees may change several times during the delay and the
union may be unknown to the employees that it will represent; 10'
but this factor was disregarded by Congress (and the Board) in
favor of industrial stability.0 2
Unlike section 8(a) (3), the refusal to bargain section contains
no provisions for remedies that might serve even as a mild deter-
rent to future violations. It is true that a determination by the
Board that an employer precipitated a strike by refusing to bar-
gain in good faith (or by other unfair labor practices in certain
situations) confers upon the strikers the right to be reinstated,
even though replaced, at the termination of the strike. The em-
ployer's failure to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers will result
in a back-pay award and a reinstatement order,es but the union
itself receives no reimbursement for its expenses incurred during
the strike. Hence, it is obvious that whether the strike is economic
or unfair labor practice in origin, economic strength will be the
decisive factor.j°
Section 8(d) of the act defines the mutual collective bargaining
obligations of employersand labor organizations, in part, as follows:
... to -meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and
-the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but whch obligation does not cor-
100. The NLRB reports are filled with cases where a union lacked the
strength to use the strike as a weapon after winning the election. The bar-
gaining status of a union can be destroyed by going through the motions of
negotiations almost as easily as by withholding recognition. See Cox, The
Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAnv. L. Rtsv. 1401, 1413 (1958).
101. See GreystoneK]itwear Corp., 186 N.:. t B. 573 (1962).
102. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
103. See Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. Int'l Union, UAW, 138 NRI.B. 35 (1902).
104. See Cox, supra note 100, at 1440. Professor Cox also suggests that
during negotiations attorneys may bargain ab initio with an eye toward pre-
paring for an unfair labor practice strike, to the detriment of the bargaining
process.
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pel either party to agree .... to a proposal or require the making
of a concesson .... 105
While many critics have stated that section 8(a)(5) is easily
evaded because it is futile to legislate a state of mind,10 0 Professor
Cox is of the opinion that in recent years the Board and the
courts have evolved a working formula in 8(a) (5) cases expressed
in negative terms as a "desire not to reach an agreement with the
union."'10 7 While conceding the limitations inherent in section
8(a) (5), Professor Cox believes that on the whole this portion of
the statute has been remarkably effective by "influencing men's
attitudes, up to a point, by declaring a higher standard of conduct
than the legal machinery can enforce.' ' 5
It may be argued that Professor Cox' optimism regarding sec-
tion 8(a) (5) is colored by his basic belief in governmental restraint
in the processes of collective bargaining;'0 9 in fact, Cox criticizes the
Board for having "come a long way since 1935"10 in attempting
to regulate, contrary to the expressed intent of the authors of the
Wagner Act, the substance of collective bargaining agreements. It
is not the purpose of this Article to discuss alternatives to the
NLRA generally, and section 8(a) (5) in particular, but the sharp
increase in the number of section 8(a) (5) charges filed in fiscal 1962
(a rise of 8 percent since 1958) coupled with the nationwide decline
in strike activity suggests that employers may be taking advantage
of a possible decline in the economic strength of organized labor.''
Section 8(a) (1) of the act is a general provision forbidding any
type of employer interference with the rights of the employees
guaranteed by the act and is therefore included in all charges of
employer unfair labor practices. 1 2 Employer conduct may also
105. NLRA § 8(d), 49 Stat. 452 ,(1935), as -amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1959). (Emphasis added.) The emphasized portion of § 8(d) was inserted
by Congress in 1947, 61 Stat. 142, as a result of criticism that -the Board and
the courts were interpreting § 8(d) to require such agreement or concession.
See Cox, s-upra note 100, at 1415.
106. See id. at 1439.
107. Id. at 1417. Professor Cox cites NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.,
205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
108. Cox, supra note 100, at 1439.
109. See Cox, Strikes and the Public Interest, Atlantic, Feb. 1960, pp. 48-51.
110. Cox, upra note 100, at 1402.
111. A report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department
of Labor shows that the number of man-days lost in the first quarter of 1903
as the result of strikes was the second lowest in the post-war period. 54
L.RR.M. 306 (1963).
112. 27 NLRB ANx. REP. 262 (1962).
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constitute an "independent" violation of section 8(a)(1)113 and in
certain circumstances may provide for the same remedy, such as
reinstatement with or without back pay, as a section 8(a) (3) viola-
tion. 14 The usual 8(a) (1) violation, however, is remedied by the
posting of notices at various locations on the employer's premises,
stating, in effect, that the employer will cease and desist from en-
gaging in the proscribed activities. Since the typical notice is a
blend of statutory language containing many words of art and fac-
tual references to the specific conduct found to be violative, it is
questionable how many notices are actually read, or if read, com-
prehended by the employees. Even if the notices do manage to in-
form the employees that the employer has violated a law by, for ex-
ample, threatening them with reprisals unless they reject a union,
the notices usually contain no assurance to employees that they will
be protected by that law if the employer actually implements his
threats.
Accordingly, there is reason to believe that as a matter of logic
employees who vote in an election held subsequent to the posting
of such notices will be more influenced in their choice of a bargain-
ing representative by the knowledge that the employer has the
power, and has indicated an intent, to retaliate against the advent
of unionism -rather than by the cold advice of the NLRB that
the employer will not threaten in the future.
A case in point will also serve to illustrate the relative impo-
tency of Board processes in remedying section 8(a) (2) violations.
A section 8(a) (2) order may provide for the disestablishment of a
company-dominated union or, at least, that the employer cease
assisting a labor organization. In either event an election typically
will follow the posting of notices unless the 8(a)(2) charge is
coupled with an 8(a)(5) order for recognition of a majority bar-
gaining representative." 5 The "assisted" union but not the "dom-
inated" union may participate in the election. In Consolidated
Edison Co.,"" the Board's decision and order issued on August 30,
113. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 798 (1945) (inter-
ference with employees' right to engage in union activities in nonworking
time).
114. See Sherry Mfg. Co., 128 NLA.B. 739 (1960) in which the Board
found a § 8(a)(1) violation in the discharge of an employee for presenting
grievances to management. Although the discriminatee was engaged in a pro-
tected, concerted activity, she was not engaged in a "union" activity; hence,
said -the Board, no § 8(a)(3) violation 'was committed. However, a reinstate-
ment and back-pay remedy was ordered.
115. See Greystone Knitwear Corp., 186 N.LUB. 578 (1962).
116. 182 N.LR.B. 1502 (1961).
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1961 sustained the trial examiner's finding that the company had
violated section 8(a)(2) on and after August 1, 1959 by permitting
union X free access, for organizational purposes, to newly acquired
power plants while denying similar privileges to union Y, which
represented the employees under the previous management. On
August 30, 1961, in a companion representation case," 7 the Board
also decided in favor of union Y's position that the power plants
did not constitute an accretion to the existing Consolidated Edi-
son unit and ordered an election to be held in the separate unit of
power plant employees. After further litigation,"8 an election was
held on March 28, 1962, both unions 'being on the ballot, and union
X, the "assisted" union, won the election. What, then, did the
Board accomplish at an enormous cost to the taxpayers? It is idle
to speculate on the factors which swayed the voters in the Consoli-
dated Edison election, but it is obvious that after the delay which
ensued in this case and would have ensued to a lesser but no less
effective extent if the process had been expedited, the Board's
cease-and-desist notice was not a major factor in the election.
C. JUDICIAL REVMW
Since 1947 the courts have been much less reluctant to set aside
a Board order than in the period prior to the advent of the Taft-
Hartley amendments. This trend perhaps has resulted from three
easily ascertainable factors: (1) the Supreme Court decided in Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB" 9 that the legislative history of the
amendments showed that Congress was displeased with what it
considered the over restricted scope of judicial review; (2) the cir-
cuit courts have freely exercised their mandate under Universal
Camera almost to the point of license and have often applied rigid
judicial concepts to what are in fact, and in theory, administrative
determinations; and (3) the Board's interpretation of the section
8(b) amendments has frequently collided with the policy of pre-
venting and remedying the unfair labor practices enumerated in
section 8(a).
117. Consolidated Edison Co., 132 N.L.RB. 1518 (1981).
118. On September 25, 1961 the employer fded a motion for reconsidera-
tion of the representation decision, which motion was denied in a supplemental
decision on Dec. 8, 1961. Consolidated Edison Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1137 (1001).
On February 7, 1962, a federal district court, on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, dismissed a suit to review the representation decision. Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. McLeod, 202 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Tho district
court was sustained on appeal March 26, 1962. Consolidated Edison Co. v.
McLeod, 302 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1962).
119. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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Section 10(e) of the original act, providing for enforcement of
Board orders, read in part: "The findings of the Board as to the
facts, if supported by evidence shall be conclusive."" 0 The Su-
preme Court, however, from the beginning had interpreted the
statute to require substantial evidence.' Furthermore, the Court
considered "substantial" to be "such relevant evidence as a rea-
sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." -
Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in
Universal Camera, found that the Court's regard for the fact-
finding functions of the Board justifiably had led to the assumption
on the part of Congress that the Court too narrowly construed its
obligation to review. This assumption, said Justice Frankfurter,
during the 1940's aided much of the criticism of the Board as being
both prosecutor and judge and as being politically biased. It
also had resulted in the insertion by Congress in 1947 of the word
"substantial" into section 10(e) and the insertion of a similar pro-
vision into the newly enacted Administrative Procedure Ac.O4
Although Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that the adverse
criticism was largely baseless and the legislative history of the
Administrative Procedure Act "hardly speaks with that clarity of
purpose which Congress supposedly furnishes courts in order to
enable them to enforce its true will,"' " Congress, he said, did ex-
press a ."mood of dissatisfaction" with the scope of review in the
past and "as legislation that mood must be respected."'" Justice
Frankfurter, in accordance with precedent,' did not, however,
lay down any precise formula for determining the scope of review,
and he indicated that primary responsibility lay with the courts of
appeals to evolve their own formulae, with the Supreme Court in-
tervening only in "rare" instances when the standard was misap-
prehended or grossly misappliedV28
Despite this admonition and an occasional reiteration of the
doctrine of judicial restraint,29 it can hardly be said that the Su-
preme Court, at least in recent years, has intervened only in "rare'"
190. Ch. 372, 49 Stat 454 (1935).
191. See Washington, V. & M. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
1221. Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
123. 340 U.S. at 478.
124. Id. -at 482; Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 245 (1940), 5
U.S.C. § 1009(e) (.1959).
125. 340 U.S. at 483.
126. Id. at 487.
127. See May Dept. Stores v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 876, 390-92 (1945).
128. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951).
129. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 <1957).
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instances.13 0 A major cause of Supreme Court review of Board
activity, however, is the necessity of reconciling conflicting deci-
sions by the circuit courts, some of which seem to have abandoned
entirely the doctrine of judicial restraint in this area since Uni-
versal Camera.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit courts have to date
formulated any discernible bases for either reversing a Board order
or deferring to the Board's expertise. 1 1 The courts seem to be pri-
marily concerned that the record contains substantial evidence to
sustain the Board's findings in the instant case.3 2 In sustaining
Board orders, the courts have generally refused to give the princi-
ple contained therein the force of doctrine, notwithstanding the
posture of the Board's decision,' aa
This tendency to restrict the Board to ad hoc decision making
doubtless has created a reluctance on the part of the Board to en-
gage in extensive rule making or codification of its decisions, to
the distress of many labor practitioners and their clients. 8 4 Yet,
in the absence of any express judicial denunciation, there is reason
to believe that the Supreme Court will not object to a Board doc-
trine or rule, provided the application thereof is not arbitrary, that
is, if full consideration is accorded to the facts of each particular
case.'35 On the other hand, this process greatly resembles the tra-
ditional common-law formulation by the courts of policies and/or
legal principles on a case-by-case basis,83 and it may not be com-
patible with the unique functions that administrative agencies
were created to perform.37
To the extent, therefore, that the number of judicial reversals
of Board determinations results from a tendency to regard the
NLRB as a common-law court rather than as an administrative
130. The circuit courts reviewed 148 Board orders in fiscal 1961. Only 65 of
these were enforced in full; 35 were enforced witah modification; 4 were par-
tially enforced and partially remanded; 13 were remanded in full and 31 were
set aside. 26 NLRB ANN. REP. 19 (1961). The 1962 report reads that 75% of
Board cases were "won in whole or in part," i.e., "enforced in full and with
modification." 27 NLRB ANN REP. 21 (1962).
131. Note, 45 Mnun. L. REv. 609, 653 (1961).
132. Id. at 620. See aLso Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the
National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALEn LJ. 729, 744-45 (1961).
'133. See Cox, supra note 100, at 1432 for criticism on this point of NLRB
v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956). See also Jenldns, The Supreme
Court and the NLRB, 9 LAB. LJ. 425,433 (1958).
134. Note, 45 A!_Nm. L. Ray. 609, 642-43 (1961).
135. Id. at 620.
136. Id. at 614.
137. McFarland, Landis" Report: The Voice of One Crying in The Wilder-
ness, 47 VA. L. Rav. 373, 408, 433 (1961).
agency entrusted with the enforcement of a public policy statute,
it would seem that the judicial emphasis is misplaced. As noted
above, the NLRA does not provide for the enforcement of private
rights. Its policies are broad, and in specific cases the effectuation
of these policies may result in inequities. But, at the same time,
the act, although partly quasi-criminal in form, does not provide
for criminal penalties for violating its terms and rarely does com-
pliance with a Board order result in those substantial deprivations
of property, with which the courts traditionally have been con-
cerned.
The third major element in the current role of the courts in the
enforcement of Board orders exists concurrently with the othdrs.
The Board's attempts -o give substance to the 8(b) provisions of
the ict-have not been generally sgccegsful in the 'courts. Unlike
the restrictions on. employer activities, the 1947 and 1959 amend-
ments were not intended to protect "commbn-aw' rights of em-
ployers.-It: is traehthat management-oriented legislators promoted
the:8(b) amendments, iid justified them with evidence that the
rapid growth in the size of unions.-since the Wagner Act required
a "balaiicing of the scales,'"as it were,' so as to protect businesses
endangered .by.the,"unfaiF' activities of powerful unions. But,
significantly, paragrapi four 6f section 1 of the current act, unlike
all of the precedinj'pargraphs in the section which refer to unfair
practices by employers, relates certainpractices by labor organiza-
tions directly to the-obstruction of commerce with no more than a
vague refdrence to the "rights herein. guaranteed."
Furthermore, the 8(b) ,imendments, almost all of them ambi-
guous;- conflicting, and the result of political, compromises," in
many cases interfered with rights that prior to the enactment of
the amendments had been protected under section 7. In fact, to
ensure that the-encroachment would not be unrestricted, Congress
in 1947 added a somewhat vague provision to the statute preserving
the right to strike; "except as specifically provided for herein.' 40
The recent NLRB Annual Reports contrast the difficulties ex-
perienced by, the Board in securing Supreme Court approval of
8(b) orders as opposed to orders restraining unfair labor practices
by employers. Folz example, in the fiscalyear ended June 30, 1959,
the Supreme Court decided four cases involving the administra-
tion of the NT ?A.'4 ' In one case, the Court, agreeing with a union
138. See Jenkins, What Is the National Labor Relations Board?, 12. U.
FLA. L -REv. 354_ (1959).
139. See note 30 supra.
140. NLRA § 13, 49 Stat. 457 (1947), as amended, 29 U..C. § 163 (1959).
141. 24 NLRB AwN. REP. 114 (1959).
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representing hotel employees, held that the Board could not de-
cline jurisdiction over an entire industry as a class."4 In two other
cases, the Court upheld Board findings in disputes involving, re-
spectively, recognition of post-complaint events under section
8(a) (5),"' and inclusion of employees' committees as labor organi-
zations under section 8(a)(2).144
In 1960, the Supreme Court decided six NLRB cases.' In five
of them, it rejected in whole or in part the Board's holdings as to
violations of section 8(b), namely: that section 8(b) (1) (A) prohib-
ited peaceful picketing by a minority union;'" that "harrassing"
tactics by a union during negotiations constituted bad faith bar-
gaining in violation of section 8(b) (3);147 that the maintenance of
a collective bargaining agreement legal on its face but executed by
a minority union on a date beyond the section 10(b) period was
violative of section 8(b)(2); 141 that an 8(b)(1)(A) order could re-
strain the respondent union from restraining the employees of
"any other employer.' 49 In the sixth case decided that year, the
Court granted the Board's motion for discovery in a back-pay
proceeding against an employer.5 0
In fiscal 1961, the Supreme Court reversed the Board on the
merits in five cases, upheld the Board in two cases, and sustained
the Board with some modification in another case.'5 ' The Court
held that section 10(k) of the NLRA requires the Board finally to
decide jurisdictional disputes, that is, the Board must determine
which of the competing unions is entitled to the work;' that an
exclusive hiring hall, without certain safeguards enunciated by the
Board, is not unlawful per se;l5 that it is beyond the Board's reme-
dial authority to order the reimbursement of all dues and fees col-
lected by a union within the 10(b) period in an illegal closed shop
situation; 54 that the Board was without power to presume the
142. Hotel Employees Union v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958).
143. NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301 (1959).
144. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959). The fourth case
was Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
145. See 25 NLRB Am. REP. 121 (1960).
146. United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 329 (1900); NLRB v.
Local 639, Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
147. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
148. Local 1424, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
149. Communications Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960).
150. NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398 (1960).
151. See 26 NLRB ANN. REP. 152 (1961).
152. NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573
(1961).
153. Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
154. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961).
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illegality of contracts that gave exclusive hiring authority to a
foreman who was required to be a union member and which incor-
porated by referende the union's general laws.'rl
In iscal 1962, the Court, sustaining the Board, held that an
employer violated section 8(a)(5) even absent bad faith by pro-
mulgating a unilateral wage increase during negotiations00 and
that an employer violated section 8(a) (8) by discharging employees
who refused to work in a shop that was "abnormally" cold. 7 In
two cases consolidated as one action the Court reversed the Fifth
Circuit and sustained the Board's findings of section 8(a)(3) dis-
crimination, primarily on a theory of restricted judicial review.1 8
In a fifth case the Court held that a circuit court erred in modify-
ing a Board order to which the parties had consented in a settle-
ment agreement executed prior to the NIRB hearing.10 9
A close examination of the Supreme Court decisions catalogued
immediately above shows that the high rate of reversal in cases
with unions as respondents is not due to an injudicious nostalgia
for the pre-Taft-Hartley era, but to the enormous difficulties of
reconciling the Taft-Hartley amendments with the main body of
the act. For example, in Curtis Bros.,100 Justice Brennan, writing
for the Court, rejected the Board's interpretation of section
8(b) (1) (A) because Congress, in contemporaneously enacting sec-
tion 13, commanded the courts "to resolve ambiguities in favor of
an interpretation of 8(b) (1) (A) which safeguards the right to strike
as understood prior to the passage of Taft-Hartley:'"11 Mr. Jgstice
Brennan further noted that even before the Wagner Act, the Su-
preme Court, in American Steel Foundries,""a had permitted unions
to "use all lawful propaganda to enlarge their membership.ca3
In Locad 357, Teamsters,""4 Justice Douglas cited Curtis Bros.
for the proposition that where Congress has adopted a selective
system for dealing with certain evils, the NLRB must confine itself
to that system.Y0 5 Justice Douglas thus rejected the Board's Moun-
155. International Typographical Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 705 (1961);
NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 865 U.S. 695 (1961).
156. NIRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
157. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 US. 9 (1962).
158. NLTLB v. Walton Mg. Co., 869 U.S. 404 (1962).
159. NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318 (1961).
160. NLRB v. Local 639, Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
161. Id. at 282.
162. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
163. 362 U.. at 282.
164. Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 865 U.S. 667 (1961).
165. Id. at 676.
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tain Pac. 16 doctrine because of its underlying rationale that an
exclusive hiring hall per se encouraged union membership in viola-
tion of sections 8(a)(3)-8(b)(2).1 7 The Court also noted that, his-
torically, union-operated hiring halls had served to abolish "kick-
backs" to employer representatives as well as other employment
evils. Local 357, Teamsters, insofar as it stands for the proposition
that the Court will not "assume that a union conducts its opera-
tions in violation of law"'"" absent a finding of actual discrimina-
tion, rejected, in effect, the Board's per se theory entirely. To cite
another example, in Pacific Intermountain Express Co.,... the
Board found a sections 8(a)(3)-8(b)(2) violation absent actual
discrimination, where an employer delegated exclusive and final
control over seniority determinations to the collective bargaining
representative.
Mr. Justice Douglas in the Local 357, Teamsters case noted
that in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,' 70 another hiring hall,
8(b) (2) situation, the Court had held that the only encouragement
or discouragement of union membership banned by the act is that
which is accomplished by discrimination; but Justice Douglas
failed to state what types of discrimination, and with what moti-
vations, would be violative. Ironically, the Board apparently re-
lied upon Radio Officers in evolving its per se doctrine,' but ac-
cording to Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Local 857, Team-
sters, the Board erroneously interpreted Radio Officers.1 2 It may
be significant on this question of judicial guidance that recently
the Board in Miranda Fuel Co. 8 decided, two members dissent-
ing, that Radio Officers and Local 357, Teamsters justify a finding
that any discrimination caused by a union, whatever its motiva-
tion, violates 8(a) (3)-8(b)(9). It is, of course, true that the Wagner
Act's provisions were broadly phrased and Congress necessarily
conferred upon the Board the task of administrative application of
those provisions, 174 but in contrast with the Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin amendments, the original act expressed an intent
166. Mountain Pacific Chapter, 119 NJL.B. 883 (1957).
167. "Congress has not outlawed the hiring hall." 365 U.S. at 673.
168. Id. at 676.
169. 107 N.L.R.B. 887 (1954).
170. 847 U.S. 17 (1954).
171. See Graham, Taft-Hartley's Enigmatic Section 8(bX2), 12 LAn. L.J.
1033, 1039 (1961).
172. 365 U.S. at 679.
178. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), rev'd and remanded, 826 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963).
174. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
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to curb unfair labor practices by employers that was capable of
general, if not precise, definition. The 1947 and 1959 amendments,
however, as noted above, were so fraught with political compro-
mise that the Board's attempts at interpretation have often
clashed with the legislative histories. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
Sand Door & Plywood Co.,1rs wrote the majority decision sustain-
ing the Board's view of a hot-cargo clause as a proper defense to a
section 8(b)(4)(A) allegation, but counseled "wariness in finding
by construction a broad policy against secondary boycotts as such
when, from the words of the statute itself, it is clear that those in-
terested in just such a condemnation were unable to secure its
embodiment in enacted law."'76
Accordingly, in Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,1'" the
Court rejected affirmance of the Board's order by the court of ap-
peals,' 78 which reasoned in its opinion that "the Board may have
thought that the interest of employee self-determination out-
weighed otherwise important competing considerations of burying
stale disputes."'7 " The Supreme Court held that the legislative
history showed that the accommodation already had been made
by Congress.'80
Despite the legislative obstacles, however, there is reason to
believe that in recent years the courts have tended to denigrate
the Board's administrative expertise, possibly by overemphasizing
the potential or immediate impact of a Board decision. In 1944,
the Supreme Court permitted the Board to adopt a rule that pro-
hibition of union solicitations on an employer's premises outside of
working hours was presumptively discriminatory as an unreason-
able impediment to self-organization. The majority decision in
Republic Aviation 8' also noted that "one of the purposes which
lead to the creation of such boards is to have decisions based upon
evidential facts under the particular statute made by experienced
officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the
subject which is entrusted to their administration.'18
It is difficult to reconcile Republic Aviation with Local 357,
Teamsters, especially since implementation of the Board's ration-
175. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NTLRB, 357 U.S.
93 (1958).
176. Id. at 100.
177. Local 1424, Intl Assoc. of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1900).
178. Local 1424, Int.1 Assoc. of Machinists v. NLRB, 264 Fed 575 (1959).
179. Id. at 581.
180. 362 U.S. at 428.
181. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
182. Id. at 800.
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ale in the latter case required only that unions and employers af-
firm, contractually and by posting notices in the l iring hall, that
the hall would be operated on a nondiscriminatory basis and that
the employer would have the ultimate right to reject all job appli-
cants. It may be argued that hiring-hall discrimination, where it
exists today in highly organized industries, more likely results
from nepotism or other forms of favoritism, rather than from
union membership in the classic sense, or the lack thereof. Never-
theless, the Board's Mountain Pac. doctrine was an attempt to
make section 8(b)(2) meaningful today and to provide some pro-
tection to "outsiders" at the union hall.
It is also difficult to reconcile the Katz183 case with Insurance
Agents""' from the standpoint of a practical implementation of
the act. In Katz the Court sustained an 8(a)(5) finding by the
Board based on a wage increase by an employer during negotia-
tions, motivated solely by economic considerations. Mr. Justice
Brennan distinguished Katz from the Insurance Agents' case on
the grounds that the 8(a)(5) wage increase effectively frustrated
collective bargaining, while the union's conduct in Insurance
Agents' was not inconsistent with good-faith bargaining'85 The
union, by its tactics in Insurance Agents', did not foreclose discus-
sion of any bargaining issue. While the harrassing tactics, said
Justice Brennan, probably did not constitute protected activities
- the employer could have discharged the strikers - nevertheless
Congress did not empower the Board "to pass judgment on the
legitimacy of any particular economic weapon used in support of
genuine negotiations.' '18 6
The Insurance Agents' decision may or may not be sound in
the light of the legislative history of section 8(b) (3), but from the
standpoint of the industrial realities, it seems naive to expect an
employer to approach the bargaining table with a mind intent on
the business at hand while periodic, but not total, interruptions
occur in his operations. It is apropos here to repeat the comment
that often courts view "problems of labor and management from
the high plateau of a general overlooking the battlefield . . . [they]
may lack the experience and information to deal with the intrica-
cies of a single maneuver . . .
183. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
184. See text accompanying note 147 upra.
185. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1961).
186. Id. at 747.
187. Note, 45 TInw. L. REV. 609, 627 (1961).
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A former Board member has said that
no law retains its vitality, nor can it long survive, unless the majority
of the citizens affected by that law are willing to comply with it, and
understand and support it .... [Hence] we [the Board] must en-
deavor to shape our decisions in such a manner that persons of average
ability and education will comprehend and understand them and feel
that they are just ... 188
This ideal, to say the least, has not yet been realized. In fact, for-
mer Board Chairman Guy Farmer has described the typical Board
decision as "institutional" rather than "personal" and as contain-
ing "all the boilerplate and appeal-discouraging provisions that
tend to obfuscate the real issues in the case."' 89
To attempt a review of all Board decisions, even for a limited
period is, of course, impossible; yet, several cases selected at ran-
dom are representative of specific failings on the part of the Board.
Together they may serve to illustrate the point sought to be made
here: With due regard for the enormous obstacles confronting the
Board, the NLRB itself has helped to frustrate the goal of indus-
trial stability by too often issuing decisions which lack clarity or
which, expressly or impliedly, reject precedent.
The Board, for example, may not contradict or reject any of
the theories advanced by its trial examiner; but it often gives a
terse reason for sustaining his Intermediate Report, which may or
may not be compatible with his rationale. In Bonham Cotton Mills,
Inc.,'-9 the Board in a one-page decision stated:
In our opinion, the evidence, viewed as a whole, establishes that Re-
spondent did not bargain in good faith, but merely entered into sterile
discussions with the Union .. . [W]e base our conclusion on the to-
tality of Respondent's activity, including unilateral acts, Respondents
failure .. .to bargain in any instance through an agent with sufficient
authority, and on other conduct, as more fully detailed by the Trial
Ezaminer, which demonstrated an absence of desire to reach agreement
with the Union."'191
The Intermediate Report in Bonham consists of 33 pages of fine
type in the official reports. Aside from the real problem of ade-
quately digesting this material without sufficient guidance from
the Board, of what use is it to the practitioner (or Board attorney)
to read the Intermediate Report if, sub silentio, the Board has re-
188. Jenkins, supra note 138, at 372.
189. Fainer, Problems of Organization, and Administration of the National
Labor Relations Board, 29 GEo. WAsH. L. lRv. 358, 305 (1960).
190. 121 N.LR.B. 1235 (1958).
191. Id. at 1235. (Emphasis added.)
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jected some or all of the examiner's legal theories, dicta, or em-
phases? In Bonham the Board, for no apparent reason, made spe-
cific mention only of the element of "insufficient authority" despite
the fact that the trial examiner did not consider this element to be
of paramount importance in the case.
Although it is often difficult to find the ratio decidendi even in
judicial opinions,'92 the need is particularly acute in the adminis-
tration of the NLRA because a typical complaint against an em-
ployer contains allegations of illegal activity violative of various
subsections of the act. (A possible explanation for this may be that
employer unfair labor practices occur, for the most part, in organ-
izing or negotiating situations; hence, an employer not uncommon-
ly may be guilty in one brief period of time of unlawful interfer-
ence, assistance to an "employees' committee," discrimination, and
refusal to bargain in good faith.)
The Board, like the courts but with less justification being an
administrative body, 98 seldom decides issues which it deems un-
necessary for disposition of the instant case. For example, the
question of the exact scope of section 8(b) (2) - or, to be more
specific, in what situations or with what motivations may a union,
with impunity, cause an employer to discipline an employee-
was presented to the Board in at least three cases9 4 but was not
decided until 196. In Studebaker Corp., 9 the first of the three,
Trial Examiner Arthur Leff devoted six pages of his Intermediate
Report to a careful and lucid discussion of the problem, but the
Board "expressed no opinion" on the question. 9 7
In Miranda Fuel Co."" the Board, with Messrs. McCulloch and
Fanning dissenting, decided that a union violates section 8(b) (2)
of the act if its agent "Smith" in a hypothetical case causes an
employer to discriminate against employee "Jones, because Jones
refuses to court Smith's daughter."' 9 Both the majority and the
dissenting opinions relied on differing interpretations of Local 357,
192. See Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Administrative
Decisions, 59 WEST VA. L. REv. 111, 112 1957).
193. See Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 YALF, L.J. 729, 734 (1961).
194. Roadway Express, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 874 (1954); Abe Meltzcr Co.,
108 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1954); Studebaker Corp., 110 NLL.R.B. 1307 (1954).
195. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), rev'd and remanded, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
196. 110 N.L.R.B. 1307 (1954).
197. See Graham, Taft-Hartley's Enigmatic Section 8(b)(2), 12 LAD. L.J.
1033, 1038 (1961).
198. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
199. Id. at 184.
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Teamsters,200 which had rejected the Board's Mountain Pao.
doctrine. 0 1
In Greenspan Engraving Corp.02 the Board held that perma-
nent striker-replacements who are hired after the voting eligibility
cut-off date are not eligible to vote although employed on the date
of the election, if the strike began before the date of the election.
The Board thus qualified its holding in Tampa Sand & Material
Co.,203 which had not imposed this condition on permanent re-
placements. In retrospect, it would seem that the Board could
have been more explicit in Tampa Sand or anticipated, at least by
way of dicta, the Greenspan situation; and thus the subsequent
litigation would have been unnecessary (the Board's Regional Di-
rector, relying on Tampa Sand, had determined that the perma-
nent replacements were eligible to vote).
In the area of hot-cargo agreements, proscribed since the 1959
amendments, the Board has consistently refused to lay down rules
of interpretation despite the complexity of the legislation itself
and the importance of this issue in many contract negotiations;
"we shall examine each such contract or agreement as it comes
before us," said the Board in one case;204 and "the language used,
the intent of the parties and the scope of the restriction vary
greatly ...and each [agreement] must meet scrutiny in terms of
the statutory restraint on its own."20 5 In another hot-cargo situa-
tion the Board did decide the question of the legality of certain
contract proposals under section 8(e) but only because the re-
spondent union hadbeen charged with a violation of section 8(b) (3)
for demanding, during negotiations, that the hot-cargo provisions
be included in the contract 0 6
It is true, as noted above, that the problems of the Board (and
the courts) are further complicated in respect to section 8(b) vio-
lations by the necessity of reconciling conflicting principles, but
the Board's efforts at reconciliation sometimes tend to ignore the
industrial realities. For example, in Shear's Pharmam, Ino., '0 the
Board ultimately based an 8(b) (2)-8(a)(3) finding solely on the
fact that a shop steward stated, during a dispute over the rights
200. Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.. 667 (1961).
201. Mountain Pac. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors. 119
N.L.R.B. 883 (1957).
202. 137 N.L.R. 1308 (1962).
203. 129 N.LT JR . 1273 (1961).
204. Mnnesot Mlk Co., 133 N.T.. 1314, 1317 (1961).
205. Ibid.
206. Amalgamated Lithographers, 130 N.L.RB. 985 (1961).
207. 137 N.LJRB. 451 (1962), supplementing 128 N.L.R.B. 1417 (1061).
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of two employees to one available job, that the charging party
could not be reinstated because she was not a member of the "store
union," for reasons, said the Board, "not explained in the rec-
ord. 20 8 The reported decision shows that neither the trial exam-
iner nor the General Counsel had considered this statement to be
evidence of discriminatory motivation. Yet the Board, in a man-
ner reminiscent of the most narrow methods of common-law ad-
judication, was prepared to order the respondents to comply with
a substantial back-pay award based on a single statement taken
out of context in the record. It is quite likely that the shop steward
was guilty only of a common failure to understand the legal subt-
leties of the union shop concept and equated, in her own mind,
employment with membership in the store union.
The same failing is illustrated by the Board's current construc-
tion of section 8(b) (7) (C), a 1959 legislative compromise which ad-
mittedly created difficulties for the Board.200 In the Crown Cafe-
teria case,21 on a motion for consideration, the Board reversed
its original holding2 ' that informational picketing was subject to
section 8(b) (7) (C), even though truthful in nature, if an object of
the picketing was for recognition or organizational purposes. Since
under ordinary circumstances it is difficult to conceive of a prag-
matic situation where a union's ultimate objective in picketing
would not be for recognition or organizational purposesz  and,
similarly, a situation where publicity is not an immediate objec-
tive of union picketing, and since Congress certainly intended to
curtail extended "blackmail" picketing by a minority union, the
Board's current philosophy might fairly be described as naive.
The Board, unlike the courts, does not always deem it neces-
sary (or convenient) to discuss all of the issues raised by the par-
ties or even by the trial examiner. In Publishers' Assooiation,21 "
the Board decided a difficult case "in the last analysis . . . on the
point of 'reasonableness.' "The Board thus affirmed the legality of
an association-wide lockout agreement as a defensive measure
against illegal strike activity, but made no reference to a major
argument advanced by the General Counsel and found to be valid
by the trial examiner, namely: implementation of the agreement
208. 128 N.L.R.B. at 1419.
209. Address by NLRB Member Gerald A. Brown, Labor Law Section
of the Minnesota Bar Assoc., in New York Law Journal, July 24, 1962, p. 4,
col. 2. See also Note, 36 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 293, 294 (1962).
210. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 135 N L R.B. 1183 (1902).
211. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 570 (1961).
212. See Note, 36 ST. Jonw's L. Rav. 293, 301 (1962).
213. 139 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1962).
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probably constituted a breach of contract by nonstruck publishers
who had bound themselves contractually not to engage in a lock-
out.
Former Board Chairman Guy Farmer has suggested that the
lack of clarity in Board decisions results from the Board's work
load and recommends, inter alia, that the Board place more reli-
ance on the intermediate report, the exceptions to the report, the
briefs and oral arguments of the parties.2 14 Other critics have
argued that the Board should assume a less judicial stance.
Professor Cornelius J. Peck has taken the position that the
Board's self-imposed restriction to ad hoc or quasi-judicial deci-
sion making has resulted in a loss of the substantial benefits which
may be derived from an intelligent combination of adjudication
and rule making. According to Professor Peck, the Board has the
power to engage in rule making by virtue of the Administrative
Procedure Act. He also charges the Board with sub rosa rule mak-
ing in at least two, and possibly four, areas of its work.215
There is no question that the Board has the power to enunciate
substantive rules if it complies with the APA, and the power to
codify its past decisions irrespective of the APA. The Board, how-
ever, generally has declined to engage in such activities, at least
in respect to unfair labor practices, allegedly because of its quasi-
judicial posture.?16 In establishing new law, the Board has also
chosen as "the wiser course," the judicial practice of applying the
new principle to the case at hand,2 17 even though the parties relied
on an unambiguous statement of policy enunciated in a prior
case.
In view of the Board's readiness to lay down rules of broad
construction in representation cases, which are not directly review-
able in the courts and (as noted above) in view of the reluctance
of the courts to accept Board doctrine as such, it may be that self
protection is the Board's prime motivation for adhering to the ad
hoc approach. Nevertheless, since the courts on review seem to be
especially concerned, perhaps unduly so, with regard for due proc-
214. Farmer, supra note 189, at 365.
215. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relatims Board, 70 YAIn L.J. 729, 781, 753 (1961).
216. See id. at 730; Address by NLRB General Counsel Stuart Rothiman,
15th Annual Fall Industrial Relations Conference of the Associated Industries
of Cleveland, Sept. 20, 1962, in 1962 CCH LAB. REL. RE. 8119.
217. Peck, supra note 215, at 740, citing Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121
N.TL .B. 995, 1006-07 (1958).
218. For a recent illustration of this practice, see General Cable Corp.,
139 N.LR.B. 1123 (1962), in which the Board extended its contract-bar
rule to permit a three-year contract to bar a rival petition.
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ess, it is possible, as Professor Peck has suggested, that the courts
would not object to prospective rule making in compliance with
the Administrative Procedure Act.211
It is also possible that the Board's failure to establish lucid
criteria to guide the courts in appraising Board decisions has re-
sulted in frequent judicial reversals, 22° since the courts can judge
an agency's action solely on the rationale advanced by the agency
itself.2l In any event, the Board can, with impunity, codify its
past decisions, and/or clarify its current decisions,22 2 so that their
full import may be made known to the public and to practitioners.
The trend towards codification in this century has been an irresist-
ible world-wide development 22 that should be compatible with
the processes of an agency that, admittedly, is in part "quasi-
legislative. 224 Even those critics who are sympathetic to the ad
hoc approach agree that some consideration should be given to the
implications of a decision for long range labor relations policy.?
It has been said, for example, that the Board may employ vague
phrases in its decisions provided that the phrases are understood
generally in labor-management circles.220 According to the Amer-
ican Bar Association,
although the NLRB 'performs adjudicatory -functions, the mass of cases
of which it disposes, though issued in the form of an adjudication, gen-
erates pressure to codify its substantive rules, if only to avoid an in-
crease in its case load, by stating the full implications of departures
from former precedents, even though unnecessary to disposition of the
immediate case.227
Related hereto is the often heard criticism that the quasi-
judicial Board, unlike the courts, and apparently to the dismay
219. Peck, supra note 215, at 746. At its 1963 meeting, the American
Bar Association's Section of Labor Relations Law for the first time paid
tribute to the NLRB inter alia for the Board's close cioperation and also
for instituting certain procedural reforms, but the Section continued to criti-
cize -the Board for failing to comply with the APA. 53 L.R.R.M. 51, 53 (1903).
220. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 402 (1947).
"The Board invites judicial intervention -by failing to articulate a rational
basis for its decisions." Note, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 128, 132 (1962).
221. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
922. See Peck, supra note 215, at 735.
223. See 1 SHERmAN, RoMAN LAW LN THE MODERN WORLD 395 (1917).
224. See Jenkins, upra note 138, at 363.
25. See Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 IIAnv. L. REV. 1401,
1435 (1958).
226. Ibid.
927. Committee on Agency Rule-Making, Report, 11 AD. L. BuLL. 275,
280 (1959).
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of the bourtS;'has little retard f6r tme principle of stare decisis. The
late Justice Jacks~nls id in one case:
If -we were obliged; to depend upon administrative interpretation for
light in f£hding the meaning of the statute, the inconsistency of the
Board's decisions -would leave us'in the dark [There'wne difficult
questions ofpolicy ifivolved in these cases which, together with changes
in Board menibership,-account for the rontradictory views that charac-
terize their history in the Board. - s
The Board's -frequent 'disregard for precedent thus may be attri-
buted in part to the frequent changes in its composition. One
methodof 'achievin greater stability in this respect would be to
appoint Board members to ten-year terms?2
Yet, anothef element, that presumably would survive this re-
form is the- responsiveness of a Board member to the labor-
management philosophy of the administration which appoints
him. This consideration, while frequently expressed without justi-
fication -0 in terms 6f political bias, admittedly is a factor of unde-
termined -weight m many Board decisions' This- element in re-
cent yearshas expressed itself for the most part in broad terms
such as theL tendency 'of the"Eisenhower Board" to attempt to
restric its jurisdiction with a consequent limitatioi of federal in-
tervention in locallindustrial stability?2 The 'Eisenhower Board"
apparently also took a negative view of its power in respect to
remedying on-the-job racial discrimination 3
The "Kennedy Board," on the other hand, recently tipped the
228. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947).
-29. See Friendly A Look at' the Federal Administrative Agcncies, 60
CoLum. L. REv. 4-9, 445 (1960).
230- See Ratner, The Quai-Judicial NLRB Revisited, 12 LAB. LU. 685
(1961); Ratner, Policy, Making by the New Quas-Jiudicial NLRB, 23 U. Cm. L.
Ruv. -12 (1955) (cr ticism of 'isenhower Board" as being anti-union). But see
PmRo, How NLRB REPn.Am TArr-H nnT r, Tm Dnsrucario or Fnm
Ewrmos CnoicE (1958) (criticism of same Board as pro-union during the
same period of time).
In-the foreword'to Petro's book, former Senator Joseph H. Ball stated:
[T]he NLRB nust accept a large measure of responsibility for the
kind of leadership too prevalent m the national unions today -arro-
gant, overbearing, corrupt, and a source of political venality unparal-
leled since the blackest chapters of Reconstruction.
Id. at viii.
231. See Address -by McCulloch, Mifchigan State University, April 19, 1902,
in CCII LAB. REr. REP. 8072.
232. See Note, The NLRB Under Republican, Administration.: Recent
Trends and Their Political Implications, 55 CoLm. L. 11Ev. 852, 905 (1955).
233. See, e.g., Intracoastal Terminal, Inc., 125 N .R.B. 359 (1959). But
cf. Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 VAN. L. Irav. 547 (1963).
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scales in favor of industrial stability (to the relief of many incum-
bent bargaining representatives23 4) and, as noted above,2 5 appar-
ently will be more reluctant than its predecessor to presume the
illegality of union conduct. Perhaps in keeping with the drive
against racial discrimination by the administration of the late
President Kennedy, the Board condemned in a representation
case, for the first time in the history of the NLRA, the practice of
racially segregated locals 3 ' and has indicated that it will hold a
union to strict impartiality, regardless of motivation, in its repre-
sentation of employeesF
3 7
The fact that the political element in Board decisions does not
express itself along more sinister lines is evident (a) from the
dearth of criticism in this regard, (b) from even a casual review of
the voting records of Board members23 8 and (c) from the perennial
unanimity among the members about procedures designed to in-
crease the Board's effectiveness.
In addition, when the President appoints an individual to the
NLRB, an agency restricted to one area of one field of law, the
prospective appointee's "labor-management philosophy" will be
both easily ascertainable and, understandably so, will be an im-
portant consideration in the selection of the candidate. Hence,
unlike a Supreme Court Justice, the new Board member's voting
attitudes can be predicted roughly ab initio.
There is also cogency to the argument that executive influence
over appointments and the consequent indirect influence over
Board decisions is desirable in that it gives the public, through its
choice of the executive, some voice in agency policy. 30 But, at the
same time, deviation from precedent certainly creates more havoc
in an administrative agency than in the courts, because the day-
to-day business of the agencies depends on subordinate employees
scattered in offices throughout the country who themselves need
guidance.2 ° The NLRB has a particular problem because of the
separation of powers between the five-man Board and its General
Counsel, who has general supervision over all field office personnel
and has final authority to decide whether an unfair labor practice
234. See note 218 s-upra.
235. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962).
236. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
237. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
288. Address by Former Chairman Boyd Leedom (an Eisenhower ap-
pointee), Labor Relations Council, Chamber of Commerce, Long Beach, Cal.,
Dec. 4, 1963: "Any assumption that the votes of any one member fall into a
strict pattern is not valid . . . ." 54 LAB. REL. REP. 381 (Dec. 9, 1963).
239. See Davis, supra note 159, at 132.
240. Id. at 134.
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complaint should issue.241 Consequently, abandonment of preced-
ent by the Board, especially in those cases where there is an even
chance of reversal by the courts,4 must inevitably result in need-
less time-consuming efforts at the regional office level. This aggra-
vates the built-in problem of delay which has been discussed above.
Finally, it is my opinion that the Board, in its attempts to
achieve substantial justice and/or to effectuate the policies of the
act in individual cases, tends to overlook the practical reality that
even if the case is decided after a relatively brief lapse of time
(e.g., six months as opposed to 18 months) the decision, in most
cases, will be moot or of slight comfort to the successful party.
Consequently, the decision should at least serve as a guide to
others involved in similar situations. But the Board, consistently
with its emphasis on the adjudicative aspect of its work, exagger-
ates the element of so-called "due process"2 at the expense of fail-
ing to illuminate through its decisions an admittedly dark corridor
of labor-management relations. In this area there is a great deal of
truth to the comment: 'Trequently it is more important that the
law be settled than that it be settled right. -44
IV. CONCLUSION
In a study of this sort, there is always the danger that the read-
er, by the sheer weight of adverse criticism, will conclude, wrongly,
that the author seeks nothing less than the abolition of that bete
noire, the National Labor Relations Board. Not at all. This Article
has sought to delineate the defects inherent in the NLRA and to
criticize, respectfully, the administration of the act and judicial re-
view of Board determinations. But the most important element
that has been emphasized herein is the role of Congress in enacting
or rejecting amendments to the substance or procedures of a
statute which attempts extensive regulation of an area of the
American economy that is charged, perhaps more so than any
other, with partisan, political considerations. No attempt has been
made here to show that the NLRA is without merit, but merely
that the beneficial results of Board activity are highly dispropor-
tionate to the price paid by the taxpayers.
It is a question, therefore, of emphasis and in my opinion too
241. 49 Stat. 451 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1959).
242.E.g., Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.RMB. 181 (1962), rev'd and remanded,
326 F.2d 172 (Rd Cir. 1963).
243. "The Board must reconcile due process with the need for expedition."
Address by NLRB Member Gerald A. Brown, Labor Law Section of the Min-
nesota Bar Ass'n (pt. 1), in New York Law Journal, July 24, 1902, p. 4, col. 1.
244. Davis, supra note 192, at 118.
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many critics have overemphasized the importance of the NLRB
in the industrial life of this country. It is one thing to acknowledge
that the Board is so much a part of the American scene that its
abolition is unthinkable and quite another thing to assume, tacit-
ly or otherwise, that reformation of the Board's process will solve
many of our socio-economic-industrial problems. In view of the
limited, though sometimes vague, scope of the NLRA and in view
of the Board's recent history of difficulties with the courts, it is
not quite reassuring to know that the Board is both influenced by
and burdened with automation, racial discrimination, and other
developments.24
The NLRA is a "lawyer's statute" in the sense that it provides
much litigation for the profession and many opportunities for law-
yers (and judges) to ponder the academic distinctions between ac-
tivity that might be violative of section 8(b)(4)(i) but not of
8(b) (4) (ii) of the statute, when for all practical purposes the result
is the same.
There is reason to believe that economic considerations, eco-
nomic strength, and not the processes of the NLRB, ultimately
will resolve almost every labor-management quarrel that comes
before the NLRB. The pre-1947 reputation of the Board as a
vehicle for the advancement of unionism still endures, even in
more sophisticated management circles, but a close appraisal of
the current statute shows that the possibilities for frustration of
the Board's processes by employers are almost limitless while
speedy injunctive relief against union activities is often readily
available to neutral employers. Ironically, in many cases, the mere
existence of the Board's representation machinery offers opportun-
ities for employers to dissipate a union's majority by secret or
covert maneuvers (the distinction is often of slight importance) or
by the legitimate exercise of the free speech guaranteed in section
8(c) of the act. Absent the NLRA, a majority union, by means of
picketing or a strike might secure recognition and a contract rath-
er quickly. But such action becomes fruitless if the employer, in
apparent good faith, submits the question concerning representa-
tion to the NILRB for determination. The statute then prohibits
the employer from recognizing the union until, perhaps six or
eight months later, the Board's certification issues. 40 The employ-
er, of course, might be pressured into withdrawing his petition.
but another union can block this action with a slight "showing of
245. See Address by General Counsel Ordman, Annual Mecting ABA
Section of Labor Relations Law, Aug. 13, 1963.
246. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1075 (1945).
1046
NLRB
interest," such as employee authorization cards. Even in one-union
situations, invocation of the Board's representation machinery
often creates a psychological block to direct action.
It is also true that too many union officials rely to an unwar-
ranted extent on NLIRB intervention in their quarrels with man-
agement, possibly for nostalgic reasons, or, more likely, because of
inertia or fear of gambling on direct, economic action.
The-Wagner Act undoubtedly spurred the growth of labor
unions, particularly the industrial unions, in this country, but a
British commentator has made the interesting observation that
the-Wagner Act merely hastened the process of collective bargain-
ing,"7 that it ran with the economic tide. Concerning the Taft-
Hartley Amendments, that commentator does not fully agree with
Professor Clyde Summers that "equality in bargaining power is
largely a product of economic forces and not legal rules, -24 but
concedes that regulatory legislation will be least effective when
it is out of line with the prevailing economic forces or with the
mutual interests of employers and unions.2 Professor Summers
has stated that the authors of the Taft-Hartley amendments did
not reckon with laissez-faire; its "downfall," he says, resulted from
the overestimation of the sponsors of the 1947 amendments of the
ability of government intervention to control private collective
action.?" For example, the ban on the closed shop has been ignored
out of sheer necessity in many industries. Other portions of the
1947 amendments (e.g., section 8(b)(2)) designed to protect the
rights of individual employees) have proved to be less effective
than Senator Taft et al. anticipated. It may be said without cyni-
cism that in stable bargaining relationships most employers pre-
fer to remain on good terms with the forces in control of the union
rather than to defend the rights of mavericks or reformers within
the group.
In addition, it has been argued in this Article that Taft-Hartley
was alien to the spirit and intent of the original act. The decline in
the percentage growth of union membership since 1947 cannot be
attributed directly or solely to Taft-Hartley; 5' but there is some
truth to the comment that, while the Wagner Act set a seal of offi-
247. Evxs, GovmaiuuENTAL REGULATmON Or INDUSTRIAL RATIONS: A
CoAPxu'TmIV STUDY OF UxrnD STATES Ai BmTim, Exprn xcE 112 (1961).
248. Summers, A Summary Evaluation of tMe Taft-Hartley Act, 11 IND.
& LA. RIE. REv. 405, 407 (1958).
949. Evs, op. cit. supra note 247, at 114.
250. Summers, supra note 248, at 412.
251. But cf. Spielman, The Taft-Hartley Law; Its Effect on the Growth
of the Labor Movement, 13 LAB. Li. 287 (1962).
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cial approval on union membership and thus stimulated recruit-
ment, Taft-Hartley created an impression in the popular mind of
official "distrust" of unionism.25 2
Finally, since political considerations are so important in this
area, there is good reason to believe that debates over the NILRA
tend to divert Congress from the necessity of enacting social legis-
lation that is far removed from the scope of the NLRA. It is
significant in respect to minimum wage legislation, for example,
that certain categories excluded under United States law, such as
service and agricultural workers, are, in Great Britain, usually
considered by Parliament to be most in need of such protection.Y58
252. EvANs, op. cit. supra note 247, at 83, 88.
253. Id. at 29.
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